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Abstract
The aim of this paper is to quantify and manage systemic risk caused by default contagion
in the interbank market. We model the market as a random directed network, where the
vertices represent financial institutions and the weighted edges monetary exposures between
them. Our model captures the strong degree of heterogeneity observed in empirical data
and the parameters can easily be fitted to real data sets. One of our main results allows us
to determine the impact of local shocks, where initially some banks default, to the entire
system and the wider economy. Here the impact is measured by some index of total systemic
importance of all eventually defaulted institutions. As a central application, we characterize
resilient and non-resilient cases. In particular, for the prominent case where the network
has a degree sequence without second moment, we show that a small number of initially
defaulted banks can trigger a substantial default cascade. Our results complement and
extend significantly earlier findings derived in the configuration model where the existence
of a second moment of the degree distribution is assumed. As a second main contribution,
paralleling regulatory discussions, we determine minimal capital requirements for financial
institutions sufficient to make the network resilient to small shocks. An appealing feature of
these capital requirements is that they can be determined locally by each institution without
knowing the complete network structure as they basically only depend on the institution’s
exposures to its counterparties.
Keywords: systemic risk, financial contagion, capital requirements, inhomogeneous random
graphs, weighted random graphs, directed random graphs
1 Introduction
State of the Art Systemic Risk was already listed in 2003 by Duffie and Singleton [21]
as one of five types of risk financial institutions are exposed to, and after the financial crisis
in 2007 it gained major importance. From today’s viewpoint, research is very diverse and
parallels recent regulatory discussions that take systemic risk considerations into account, see
[5, 10]. An overview of the different approaches to study systemic risk can be found e. g. in [25].
One important line of research addresses explicitly the network structure of the financial system,
where institutions correspond to vertices in the network and edges represent dependencies among
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them, for example monetary exposures. Note that such exposures are more various than only
usual Loans; they can result from Securities Cross-holdings, Derivatives and Foreign Exchange,
see [34]. The recent monograph [29] serves as a good reference for methods relying on network
models, which is also the focus of this paper. There, Hurd summarizes recent literature and
identifies Systemic Risk as comprising of some triggering shock event and a propagation of it
through the system that has a major impact on the macroeconomy. For the latter, he further
lists four main channels via which the triggering shock event propagates: Asset Correlation,
Default Contagion, Liquidity Contagion, and Market Illiquidity and Asset Fire Sales.
Of the above mentioned propagation mechanisms of systemic risk, Default Contagion prob-
ably is the one that has been studied the most in the existing literature. One of the most
prominent models is the one by Eisenberg and Noe [22], where uniqueness of a clearing vector is
investigated for liabilities when some institutions cannot fully pay off their debt. The model was
extended in various works, see for example [35, 37], where several issues, such as the assumption
that default happens without additional costs or additional contagion channels, are addressed.
Gai and Kapadia [26] even assumed a recovery rate of zero, i. e. default costs of 100%. This
is reasonable for investigating the contagion mechanism, since processing defaults may take
months or even years – time that institutions in financial distress do usually not have. Further-
more, directly after the default of an institution there is high uncertainty about its assets’ value
and the mark-to-market recovery rate is hence likely to be very low. As a striking example, in a
bond auction for the settlement of credit default swaps written on Lehman Brothers just three
weeks after its default the realized recovery rate only amounted to 8.625% [1].
There are various possible approaches to building a network model for the financial system.
The most direct one is to work with the concrete observed structure of the financial network of
interest. This is the approach used in [22] and its extensions. Similarly, [13] develops matrix
majorization tools that allow to compare financial systems with different liability concentration
in terms of the systemic loss generated. Financial networks also experience some change over
time, however, and to make statements about the resilience of possible scenarios of the financial
system in future it might not be advisable to simply consider today’s observed network. In
[15] for example, the authors develop a structural default model and use a Bayesian network
approach to derive formulas for the joint default and survival probability that can be computed
explicitly. Although not directly related to a default cascade, another structural stochastic
model that describes interbank lending was proposed in [24] and modified/extended in [14, 33].
An alternative approach, and the one being followed here, is to consider a random graph
which is such that a typical sample resembles the important statistical characteristics such as the
degree distribution of the real network. One of the biggest strengths of this approach is that it
allows for the employment of the powerful tool of probabilistic limit theorems to asymptotically
obtain analytic results for large networks in the analysis of systemic risk. Moreover, these results
are then robust with respect to local changes of the network over time as they are expressed in
terms of statistical characteristics of financial networks which have been shown to be relatively
stable over time (see e. g. [17]). A popular choice for such a random model is the configuration
model, as pursued by Amini et al. [3, 4] for example. Among other results, there it was shown
that a financial network is resilient to small initial shocks if and only if a specific measure
depending only on the number of so-called contagious links is negative; a debt is referred to as
contagious if the bank cannot sustain the default of the corresponding counterparty. Thus, in
this approach resilience is a property that can be characterized in terms of local effects only.
The resilience criterion in [3] is rather strong, but the paper makes a crucial assumption on
the structure of the networks: it requires that the underlying degree distribution has a finite
second moment. The reason is a technical one: without this condition the probability that the
configuration model generates a simple network (i. e. with no multiple edges or loops) is tiny, see
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also [30], and hence results that hold with high probability for the configuration model are not
necessarily true when conditioning on simplicity of the graph. Real networks, however, are such
inhomogeneous that their degree distribution does not necessarily have this property. Evidence
of this is given in [12] and [17], where the degrees of the Austrian respectively the Brazilian
banking system are shown to be Pareto distributed with parameter β ∈ (2, 3). Apart from that,
a key property of real world financial networks, see for example [18], is a distinct core-periphery
structure, where a few large banks are connected to many other large or small banks, but small
banks are connected only to few others. In models of random graphs such structures appear
only when the underlying degree distribution has no second moment [36].
In the literature on random graphs there have been several proposals for constructing inho-
mogeneous simple random graphs. In [16] for example the network is constructed for specified
expected degrees (also called weights or fitness) of the vertices via a multiplicative specification
of edge probabilities. In [11] a more general kernel function for the probabilities is chosen.
Whereas these examples construct undirected networks, however, financial networks clearly are
directed. In [19], the first three authors of this article have hence developed a directed version
of the random graph in [16] which will also be the base for our model in this article. Also see
[27] for a directed fitness model in the context of financial networks.
Contribution of this Work The first aim of this paper is to address the previously mentioned
shortcomings. In particular, we will complement and extend the results in [3, 4] so that they can
be applied to broader and more prominent settings, where for example the degree distributions
are allowed to have an unbounded second moment. As it turns out, deriving precise results in
the more general setting with less assumptions is possible; however, we will also observe that the
resilience criteria turn out to be not as simplistic as in [3, 4] and comprise of many global effects
and interactions. Another main contribution is then the determination of sufficient minimal
capital requirements for controlling systemic risk in financial networks. A striking feature of
the derived management strategies is that the capital requirement of each bank can basically
be determined locally by only knowing the profile of the particular bank. This is in contrast to
other management (or allocation) rules obtained in deterministic networks which can only be
specified in terms of the complete network structure for each bank.
Our starting point is paper [19], where the first three authors developed a directed random
graph model that makes it possible to study random graphs whose underlying degree distribu-
tion is not necessarily required to possess a second moment, while simultaneously preserving
the simplicity of the network. Whereas financial networks are clearly weighted in the sense
that exposures between banks have a monetary value, [19] is only capable of investigating the
following simplified contagion mechanism: each bank is assigned an integer-valued threshold
that represents the number of debtors in the network that need to default in order for the bank
to default as well. It is not clear how such threshold values could be determined for an observed
network since the size of loans issued to defaulted debtors also plays an important role in the
contagion mechanism for financial networks.
In this article, we construct a model for financial networks that combines the simple, directed
and inhomogeneous structure of [19] with weighted edges (monetary exposures). Our model
directly contains capitals of the banks and exposures between the banks as parameters and
is therefore easily calibrated to observed network structures. Furthermore, the present paper
makes the following contributions.
A Random Graph Model for Financial Networks As already described briefly, we define a
model that combines many properties observed for real financial networks such as simplicity
and directedness of the links between institutions, weighted connections and a strong degree of
inhomogeneity. As a basic building block we use the model from [19], and we enhance it with
capitals on the vertices and weights on the edges which represent exposures. This allows to use
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some results from [19] in the proofs for our enhanced model. We are able to make asymptotic
statements for large networks about the impact that fundamental defaults have on the financial
system and the wider economy due to their propagation through the network via a cascade
mechanism. We strengthen the results in [19] for an upper bound on the final damage caused
by a default cascade in order to use it in the proofs of our subsequent results. Compared to the
existing literature where mostly only the number of defaulted banks is considered as systemic
risk factor, our setup allows to account for more general systemic importance each bank has
for the financial network or the real economy, e. g. by providing infrastructure for the payment
system or a considerable share in the lending business. This is in line with latest regulatory
methods where banks are placed into certain buckets depending on their systemic importance
[5, 10]. While our model is intended primarily to model Default Contagion, it can also be used
to describe Illiquidity Contagion or other percolation processes on weighted networks.
Resilience Criteria and Systemic Risk Capital Requirements We derive explicit criteria that
determine whether a financial network is resilient to contagion with respect to small shocks
caused by extraordinary events, such as for example a stock market crash, natural disasters
or war, that trigger the default of a few institutions. Our model specification allows us to
choose these shocks in a possibly highly correlated way, which is in line with the channel of
Asset Correlation listed above. Under certain conditions, we can determine the amplification
factor of small initial shocks to the network. We then employ the resilience criteria to derive
a formula for the risk capital that is sufficient to make the system resilient to initial shocks.
Due to the fact that we allow for infinite second moment of the degree sequences in our model,
the derived risk capital turns out to be more restrictive than simply prohibiting contagious
links as proposed in [3]. We derive a robust formula for a threshold that will make the system
resilient and relies on the normalized expected in-degree w− of a certain bank by a sublinear
form α(w−)γ , where α > 0 and γ ∈ (0, 1). Here robustness refers to the dependence structure
of in- and out-degrees. For the reasonable case of upper tail dependent degree sequences the
threshold is sharp in the sense that barriers αc and γc for the values of α and γ exist below
which the system is non-resilient and above which it is always resilient. We then state how such
threshold values can be transformed into monetary capital requirements. This contributes to
the ongoing discussion about adequate risk capital that was for example discussed by the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision in [5] or by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve
System in [10].
Most papers on systemic risk deal with the problem of assessing the total systemic risk
present in a financial network. A second important aspect, however, that is dealt with much
less in the literature is the allocation of total systemic risk to individual institutions and the
related question of deriving capital charges for them. In this context, complicated questions like
‘What is a fair allocation?’ or ‘Should one impose higher systemic risk charges on institutions
that in some sense are prone to transmitting systemic risk or on institutions that connect to
such systemic banks and hence expose themselves to systemic risk?’ arise. Approaches to these
problems have for example been developed in [23] and [9]. However, to the best of our knowledge,
all existing proposals of systemic risk allocations in the literature require the knowledge of the
complete network to be determined. While a regulator might possess this knowledge, it seems
complicated to communicate such systemic risk charges when the institutions cannot reconstruct
those themselves. Also in this setting the capital charge of one bank might depend on the action
of the other banks, which gives rise to possible manipulation. A very appealing feature of our
approach is that each institution can compute its own systemic risk charge by basically just
knowing its local neighborhood, i. e. by knowing its counter parties. This is possible by averaging
effects for large networks and inherently ensures fairness in the sense that a bank’s capital
requirement only depends on its own business decisions. Furthermore, agents are prevented
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from manipulating capital charges of competitors. Further, a bank’s systemic risk charge only
depends on the default risk the bank itself is exposed to and not on risk that the bank raises
to other banks, i. e. our systemic risk capital requirements are in line with the traditional risk
management approach of individual institutions. Also it has the advantage over models such as
[22], which only consider the current state of a network, that also future configurations of the
network are likely to be resilient using the same formula. A further insight is that it is in line
with the analysis in [13] where it was found that the real network topology is unbalancing and
as a consequence a deconcentration of exposures is desirable for stability.
Outline The article is structured as follows: Section 2 describes our model for financial net-
works and states our main result about the damage caused by a default cascade in the model.
In the third section, we first state sufficient criteria for resilience respectively non-resilience and
then provide a rigorous proof of the formula describing the necessary risk capital of banks in a
financial system. In Section 4 we pursue simulation studies to support our findings. All proofs
in this article are placed in Section 5.
2 Default Contagion on a Weighted, Directed Random Graph
We shall present a stochastic model for a weighted, directed financial network. It will be based
on the directed random graph model proposed in [19] (see Subsection 2.2) but complemented
by edge weights. The main objective will be to assess the damage caused by default contagion
asymptotically when the network size grows to infinity.
2.1 Default Contagion and Systemic Importance
We first describe the process of default contagion on a given (deterministic) financial network. If
n ∈ N is the size of the network, we label the institutions (for simplicity called banks hereafter)
by indices i ∈ [n], where [n] := {1, . . . , n}, and interpret them as vertices in a graph. If
furthermore ei,j ∈ R+,0 describes the exposure of bank j to bank i, then we draw a directed
edge of weight ei,j from i to j in the graph if ei,j > 0. We do not allow for self-loops or
multiple edges between two vertices pointing in the same direction. That is, ei,i = 0 for all
i ∈ [n] and the network structure is completely determined by the exposure matrix (ei,j)i,j∈[n].
Moreover, consider for each bank i ∈ [n] its capital/equity ci ∈ R+,0,∞ := R+,0 ∪ {∞} and
a value of systemic importance si ∈ R+ which measures the potential damage caused by the
default of bank i and could, for instance, be computed by a regulating institution according to
the indicator-based approach developed by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision in its
framework text from 2013 in order to measure global systemic importance of banks [5]. The
focus is on the impact of a potential default on the global financial system and wider economy.
A similar approach is pursued by the Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System [10].
Another example of deriving systemic importance values is to use DebtRank as introduced in
[7]. It focuses on the relative monetary impact of a bank in an interbank network.
We call bank i solvent if ci > 0 and insolvent/defaulted if ci = 0 (caused by some exogenous
shock to the network). The set of initially defaulted banks is hence given by D0 = {i ∈ [n] :
ci = 0}. They trigger a default cascade D0 ⊆ D1 ⊆ ... given by
Dk =
{
i ∈ [n] : ci ≤
∑
j∈Dk−1
ej,i
}
, (2.1)
where in each step k ≥ 1 of the cascade process bank i has to write off its exposures to banks that
defaulted in step k−1 and goes bankrupt as soon as its total write-offs exceed its initial capital.
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The chain of default sets clearly stabilizes after at most n − 1 steps and we call Dn = Dn−1
the final default cluster in the network induced by D0. We could easily introduce a constant
recovery rate R ∈ [0, 1) to our model by multiplying exposures ej,i by a factor 1−R in (2.1).
A first approach, that is often pursued in current literature, is to identify the damage caused
to the financial network with the fraction n−1|Dn|. That is, damage is bearable if only few banks
default as a result of the external shock event and the thereby started cascade process and it
becomes the more threatening the larger the final fraction of defaulted banks n−1|Dn| gets. In
line with current regulator considerations, however, it is more realistic to consider the more
general index of systemic importance of defaulted banks to really measure the damage to the
economy. Instead of the size of the final default cluster Dn, in the following we hence consider
its total systemic importance Sn :=
∑
i∈Dn si as a measure for the damage caused. Clearly, the
special case Sn = |Dn| is covered by setting si = 1 for each i ∈ [n].
2.2 A Special Case: the Threshold Model from [19]
Consider for now the special case that ei,j ∈ {0, 1} and ci ∈ N0,∞ := N0∪{∞}. That is, whether
or not a bank in the network defaults depends on the number of defaulted debtors (and the
bank’s individual integer-valued capital ci). This setting (we call it the threshold model) was
considered in [19] and we recall its model assumptions and the main result here.
Instead of a deterministic network structure, we describe the network as a random graph.
To this end, (in addition to capital ci and systemic importance si) assign to each vertex i ∈ [n]
two deterministic vertex-weights w−i ∈ R+ and w+i ∈ R+ and define the probability pi,j of a
directed edge from vertex i to vertex j being present by
pi,j = min{1, w+i w−j /n}1i 6=j . (2.2)
Further, let Xi,j be the indicator function for the event of edge (i, j) sent from vertex i to vertex
j being present and assume that these events are independent for all i, j ∈ [n]. The role of in-
weight w−i respectively out-weight w
+
i is to determine the tendency of vertex i ∈ [n] to have
incoming respectively outgoing edges. The vertex-weights are deterministic and purely used as
a mean to specify the edge probabilities. They should not be confused with the edge-weights
ei,j . The construction of the random graph via vertex-weights resembles the one in [16] or more
general in [11]. Note, however, that our random graph is a directed generalization.
For each random configuration of the network, we can then consider the cascade process
(2.1) to derive the random final default cluster Dn as well as its random systemic importance
Sn. The idea in the following is to let the network grow in a regular fashion (see Assumption
2.1) and to use law-of-large-numbers effects in order to derive a deterministic limit for n−1Sn.
For each network size n ∈ N let w−(n) = (w−1 (n), . . . , w−n (n)), w+(n) = (w+1 (n), . . . , w+n (n)),
s(n) = (s1(n), . . . , sn(n)) and c(n) = (c1(n), . . . , cn(n)) sequences of in-weights, out-weights,
systemic importances and capitals of the individual banks. We impose the following regularity
conditions:
Assumption 2.1. For each n ∈ N, denote the joint empirical distribution function of w−(n),
w+(n), s(n) and c(n) by
Fn(x, y, v, l) = n
−1 ∑
i∈[n]
1{w−i (n) ≤ x,w+i (n) ≤ y, si(n) ≤ v, ci(n) ≤ l}, (x, y, v, l) ∈ R3+×N0,∞,
and let (W−n ,W+n , Sn, Cn) a random vector distributed according to Fn. We assume that:
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1. Convergence in distribution: There exists a distribution function F on R3+ × N0,∞
such that F (x, y, v, l) = 0 for all x, y ≤ x0 and x0 > 0 small enough, and such that
at all points (x, y, v, l) for which Fl(x, y, v) := F (x, y, v, l) is continuous in (x, y, v), it
holds limn→∞ Fn(x, y, v, l) = F (x, y, v, l). Denote by (W−,W+, S, C) a random vector
distributed according to F .
2. Convergence of average weights and systemic importance: W−, W+ and S are
integrable and E[W−n ]→ E[W−], E[W+n ]→ E[W+] as well as E[Sn]→ E[S] as n→∞.
This assumption is of a technical nature and concerned with the behavior of the network pa-
rameters as the size of the network tends to infinity. For practical purposes one can think of
Assumption 2.1 ensuring that the limiting network keeps the observed parameter distribution
of some real network we want to investigate. In particular, the expected weights are assumed
to stay finite. In [19] it was derived that Assumption 2.1 implies D−i ∼ Poi(w−i E[W+]) respec-
tively D+i ∼ Poi(w+i E[W−]) in the limit n → ∞, where D−i and D+i denote the random in-
respectively out-degree of vertex i with weights (w−i , w
+
i ). Conversely, one can show that for
an observed network topology, i. e. given in- and out-degrees, maximum likelihood estimators
of the in- and out-weights are approximately given by the in- and out-degrees (normalized by
some global factor). That is, morally one can think of the in- respectively out-weight of a vertex
as its in- respectively out-degree.
Further, note that we did not assume W− or W+ to have finite second moment. By the
result from [19] that the empirical degree distribution for the model above converges weakly to
a random vector (D−, D+) distributed as Poi(W−E[W+],W+E[W−]), we see that our model
is hence capable of modeling networks without a second moment condition on their degree-
sequences. In particular, choosing W− and W+ power law distributed with parameters β−
respectively β+ results in power law distributions for the degrees D− and D+ with the very
same parameters. This allows to calibrate our model parameters to observed empirical in-
and out-degree sequences. As we will see in Sections 3.2 and 3.3, these power law parameters
carry the most important information about the network when it comes to determining resilient
capital requirements.
Consider now the following heuristics: Let ζ ∈ [0,E[W+]] denote the total out-weight of
finally defaulted banks divided by n. Then in the limit n→∞ for any bank i ∈ [n] the number
of finally defaulted neighbors in the network is given by a random variable Poi(w−i ζ). Bank i is
thus finally defaulted itself if and only if Poi(w−i ζ) ≥ ci. Summing over all banks in the network
we therefore derive the following identity:
E[W+ψC(W−ζ)] = ζ,
where
ψr(x) := P (Poi(x) ≥ r) =
{∑
j≥r e
−xxj/j!, 0 ≤ r <∞,
0, r =∞.
Moreover, summing up the systemic importance values, the final damage caused by defaulted
banks should be given by E[SψC(W−ζ)].
Motivated by these heuristics consider now the function
f(z; (W−,W+, C)) := E
[
W+ψC(W
−z)
]− z.
By the dominated convergence theorem, f(z; (W−,W+, C)) is continuous and has a smallest
root zˆ ∈ [0,E[W+]]. Furthermore, let
d(z; (W−,W+, C)) := E[W−W+φC(W−z)]− 1,
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the weak derivative of f (see Lemma 2.4), where
φr(x) := P (Poi(x) = r − 1) 1r≥1.
A sequence of events (En)n∈N shall hold with high probability (w. h. p.) if P(En) → 1, as
n→∞. The following theorem for the threshold model will be used in the proofs of our main
results in this article.
Theorem 2.2 (adapted from [19, Theorem 7.2]). Consider a sequence of financial systems
satisfying Assumption 2.1. Then the following holds:
1. For all  > 0 with high probability:
n−1Sn ≥ E
[
SψC(W
−zˆ)
]− .
2. If d(z) is bounded from above by some constant κ < 0 on a neighborhood of zˆ, then
n−1Sn p−→ E
[
SψC(W
−zˆ)
]
, as n→∞.
The theorem thus allows us to compute the final damage Sn for n→∞.
2.3 The Exposure Model
On the base of the threshold model from the previous subsection, we will now construct our
weighted, directed random graph model for financial systems. At this, we uncouple the occur-
rence of an edge sent from i to j from the size of its possible edge-weight. That is, we model the
occurrence of edges by the random matrix X = X(n) = (Xi,j)i,j∈[n] from Subsection 2.2 and we
assign to each pair (i, j) ∈ [n]2 with i 6= j a random variable Ei,j > 0 representing j’s possible
exposure to i (set Ei,i = 0 for all i ∈ [n]) such that E = E(n) = (Ei,j)i,j∈[n] is independent of
X (clearly one can construct such a joint probability space). The random exposure of j to i is
then given by ei,j = Xi,jEi,j .
To make the model analytically tractable, we assume that for each bank j the list of possible
exposures E1,j , . . . , Ej−1,j , Ej+1,j , . . . , En,j is an exchangeable sequence of random variables.
That is, for each j ∈ [n] and each permutation pi of [n]\{j}
(E1,j , . . . , Ej−1,j , Ej+1,j , . . . , En,j)
d
=
(
Epi(1),j , . . . , Epi(j−1),j , Epi(j+1),j , . . . , Epi(n),j
)
.
This is equivalent to taking for each bank j ∈ [n] an arbitrary sequence of random variables
E˜1,j , . . . , E˜j−1,j , E˜j+1,j , . . . , E˜n,j and transforming them into a list of exposures E1,j , . . . , Ej−1,j ,
Ej+1,j , . . . , En,j by Ei,j = E˜pi(i),j for some random permutation pi independent of {E˜i,j}i∈[n]\{j}
and uniformly drawn from the set of all permutations of [n]\{j}. We remark that the require-
ment of exchangeable exposures is a typical assumption made in the literature (such as [3]).
Note, however, that in this setting the distribution of the exposure size Ei,j only depends on
the creditor bank j and not on the debtor bank i, which might be a criticizable assumption
for example in strongly pronounced core/periphery networks where also the exposures might
exhibit stronger heterogeneity. The relaxation of this assumption is technically more demanding
and beyond the scope of this paper, but we refer to [20] where this problem is tackled.
Furthermore, assign to each bank i ∈ [n] a possibly stochastic capital value ci ∈ R+,0,∞ and
a deterministic systemic importance value si ∈ R+. Using (2.1) we can then again determine the
random final default cluster Dn and its systemic importance Sn. It is the aim of the following
8
Observed Network Exposure Model
capital ci ∈ R+,0, capital ci ∈ L0(R+,0,∞),
systemic importance si ∈ R+, systemic importance si ∈ R+,
in-degree d−i ∈ N0, in-weight w−i ∈ R+,
out-degree d+i ∈ N0, out-weight w+i ∈ R+,
(edge probability pi,j = min{1, w+i w−j /n}1i 6=j)
exposure sequence (ei,j)j∈[n]\{i} ⊂ R+,0 exchangeable sequence of possible edge weights
(Ei,j)j∈[n]\{i} ⊂ L0(R+)
Table 1: Comparison of observed quantities in a financial network and the model parameters
in the exposure model
subsection to derive results about convergence and deterministic bounds similar as in Subsection
2.2 for the threshold model.
Table 1 summarizes all important parameters in the exposure model and compares them to
the observed quantities in a financial network.
2.4 Asymptotic Results for Default Contagion in the Exposure Model
The setting in the exposure model is more complex than in the threshold model since we
cannot decide if a bank defaults only based on the number of its neighbors that default: (2.1)
asserts that this also depends on the actual exposures between the banks. However, one crucial
assumption that we made is that these exposures are exchangeable, so intuitively it should make
no difference which neighbors of a given bank default, but just their actual number.
To formalize this intuitive argument, define for each bank i ∈ [n] the random threshold value
τi(n) := inf
{
s ∈ {0} ∪ [n− 1] :
∑
`≤s
Eρi(`),i ≥ ci
}
, where ρi(`) := `+ 1`≥i, (2.3)
with the usual convention inf ∅ := ∞, that is, τi is allowed to take the value ∞ if capital ci
is larger than the sum of all possible exposures. In this case, bank i can never default. The
use of the enumeration ρi becomes necessary in (2.3) since we want to spare i in this natural
ordering. The value τi then determines the hypothetical default threshold of i, assuming that
i’s neighbors default in the order of their natural index given by ρi and that all edges (j, i),
1 ≤ j ≤ ρi(τi), i 6= j, are present in the graph. We denote the hypothetical threshold sequence
by τ (n) = (τ1(n), . . . , τn(n)). The thresholds are only hypothetical, since not all of the first ρi(τi)
exposures must be present in the graph and the vertices do usually not default in their natural
order. However, we know that the exposures are exchangeable, so all these simplifications should
have no effect; it will turn out in the proof of Theorem 2.5 that indeed the value τi captures the
actual dynamics: the qualitative characteristics of the contagion process in the exposure model
are the same as in the threshold model with capital sequence τ (n).
As an equivalent of Assumption 2.1 for the threshold model we need to impose the following
regularity conditions:
Assumption 2.3. For each n ∈ N, denote the random joint empirical distribution function of
w−(n), w+(n), s(n) and τ (n) by
Gn(x, y, v, l) = n
−1 ∑
i∈[n]
1{w−i (n) ≤ x,w+i (n) ≤ y, si(n) ≤ v, τi(n) ≤ l}, (x, y, v, l) ∈ R3+×N0,∞.
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Then we assume that:
1. Almost sure convergence in distribution: There exists a deterministic distribution
function G on R3+ × N0,∞ such that G(x, y, v, l) = 0 for all x, y ≤ x0 and x0 > 0 small
enough, and such that at all points (x, y, v, l) for which Gl(x, y, v) := G(x, y, v, l) is con-
tinuous in (x, y, v), it holds almost surely limn→∞Gn(x, y, v, l) = G(x, y, v, l). Denote by
(W−,W+, S, T ) a random vector distributed according to G.
2. Convergence of average weights and systemic importance: W−, W+ and S are
integrable and
∫
R3+×N0,∞ x dGn(x, y, v, l)→ E[W
−],
∫
R3+×N0,∞ y dGn(x, y, v, l)→ E[W
+] as
well as
∫
R3+×N0,∞ v dGn(x, y, v, l)→ E[S] as n→∞.
To ensure that Assumption 2.3 holds, a twofold regularity is needed. Firstly, for a vertex with
given in- and out-weight, the distribution of the threshold value must stabilize, even though the
number of exposures appearing in the sum in (2.3) increases. Secondly, a law of large numbers
for the empirical distribution of the threshold values has to hold. See Subsection 2.5 for general
examples of financial systems satisfying Assumption 2.3.
For the remainder of this subsection, we consider a sequence of financial systems denoted as
(w−(n),w+(n), s(n), E(n), c(n)) and satisfying Assumption 2.3. In particular, we denote by
(W−,W+, S, T ) a random vector distributed according to the limiting distribution G from
Assumption 2.3. We assume that the financial systems have experienced an external shock
such that a positive fraction of banks have capital zero. In the notation from above this means
P(T = 0) > 0. Hence we are in a situation in which a default cascade is about to happen
and we are interested in the damage to the financial system and the wider economy, given by
Sn =
∑
i∈Dn si the total systemic importance of defaulted banks after the contagion process.
This damage Sn is a random number for each n ∈ N. As the network size gets large, however,
we show that n−1Sn converges to a deterministic value which we can determine exactly. To this
end, we denote
f(z; (W−,W+, T )) := E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)
]− z,
where as in Subsection 2.2
ψr(x) := P (Poi(x) ≥ r) =
{∑
j≥r e
−xxj/j!, 0 ≤ r <∞,
0, r =∞,
and
d(z; (W−,W+, T )) := E[W−W+φT (W−z)]− 1,
where again as in Subsection 2.2
φr(x) := P (Poi(x) = r − 1) 1r≥1.
Whenever (W−,W+, T ) is clear from the context, we abbreviate f(z; (W−,W+, T )) by f(z)
and d(z; (W−,W+, T )) by d(z). The following lemma summarizes some properties of f and d.
See Subsection 5.1 for the proof.
Lemma 2.4. The function f(z) is continuous on [0,∞) and admits the following representation:
f(z) = E[W+1{T=0}] +
∫ z
0
d(ξ)dξ (2.4)
If P(T = 0) > 0, then f(z) has a strictly positive root zˆ.
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In particular, d(z) is the weak derivative of f(z) and if d(z) is continuous on some interval
I ⊂ [0,∞), then f(z) is continuously differentiable on I with derivative d(z).
We derive the following result about Sn, the damage caused to the system. It resembles Theorem
2.2 for the threshold model and indeed in the proof (see Subsection 5.1) we make use of this
result. However, due to the hypothetical nature of the threshold sequence τ (n) this application
is not straight-forward and requires considerable effort.
Theorem 2.5. Under Assumption 2.3, suppose P(T = 0) > 0 and let zˆ be the smallest positive
root of f(z). If the weak derivative d(z) of f(z) is bounded from above by some constant κ < 0
on a neighborhood of zˆ, then
n−1Sn p−→ E[SψT (W−zˆ)], as n→∞.
Two remarks are in order: First, if f(z) is continuously differentiable on a neighborhood of zˆ
with f ′(zˆ) < 0 (i. e. zˆ stable), then Theorem 2.5 is applicable. This is a standard assumption
in current literature. In [3], for instance, the authors assume degree sequences of finite second
moment. In this case, it is straight forward to show that f(z) is continuously differentiable.
Secondly, without the assumption of stableness, n−1Sn does not converge to a deterministic
number in general (see [31] for a comparable result in a much simpler setting). However, in the
following theorem we are still able to state asymptotic bounds rather than an exact limiting
value. We believe that the derived bounds are sharp in the sense that they cannot be improved
without further assumptions. Proving this, however, is beyond the scope of this article.
Theorem 2.6. Under Assumption 2.3, suppose P(T = 0) > 0 and let zˆ be the smallest positive
root of f(z). Further, let z∗ be the smallest value of z > 0 at which f(z) crosses zero,
z∗ := inf {z > 0 : f(z) < 0} .
Then the following holds:
1. For all  > 0, with high probability n−1Sn ≥ E[SψT (W−zˆ)]− .
2. If further d(z) is continuous on some neighborhood of z∗, then for all  > 0 with high
probability n−1Sn ≤ E[SψT (W−z∗)] + . In particular, if zˆ = z∗, then
n−1Sn p−→ E[SψT (W−zˆ)], as n→∞.
See Subsection 5.1 for the proof. Note that under the assumptions of Theorem 2.6 it holds that
f(0) > 0. Together with continuity of f from Lemma 2.4 this implies that z∗ ≥ zˆ. In general,
however, it is possible that z∗ > zˆ, for example if f has a local minimum at zˆ.
2.5 Examples for Financial Systems Satisfying Assumption 2.3
In this section, we want to demonstrate the wide applicability of our model. In Example 2.7,
we describe a financial system where banks are sorted into buckets according to their weight
and capitals as well as exposures have the same distributions for all banks within each bucket.
Example 2.7. Let (w−(n),w+(n), s(n)) be a triple consisting of in-weight, out-weight and
systemic importance sequences such that the empirical distribution
F˜n(x, y, v) = n
−1 ∑
i∈[n]
1
{
w−i (n) ≤ x,w+i (n) ≤ y, si ≤ v
}
, (x, y, v) ∈ R3+,
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converges to some distribution function F˜ . To be consistent with Assumption 2.3, we require
F˜ (x, y, v) = 0 for all x, y ≤ x0 and some x0 > 0. Further, assume limn→∞ E[(W−n ,W+n , Sn)] =
E[(W−,W+, S)], where (W−n ,W+n , Sn) ∼ F˜n and (W−,W+, S) ∼ F˜ . Choose some partition of
[0,∞)3 into countably many sets Dk, k ∈ N. Further, denote Wk := {i ∈ [n] : (w−i , w+i , si) ∈
Dk}. Let the distributions of Ej,i, j ∈ [n], and ci be equal across vertices i ∈ Wk and assume
them all to be independent. From this assumption it follows that for n ≥ l ∈ N0 the distribution
of Y li := 1{τi≤l} only depends on the category Wk 3 i. Therefore, denote qlk := P(Y li = 1) for
i ∈ Wk.
We show that Assumption 2.3 is satisfied. For this let (x, y, v) ∈ R3+ a point of continuity
of F˜ and define
W(x,y,v) := {i ∈ [n] : w−i ≤ x,w+i ≤ y, si ≤ v}.
The cardinality of W(x,y,v) ∩ Wk stabilizes as a fraction of n for all k by the regularity of the
weight sequences. Since clearly Y li ∈ L1, this yields that
G(x, y, v, l) := lim
n→∞n
−1 ∑
i∈W(x,y,v)
E[Y li ] = limn→∞n
−1∑
k∈N
∣∣∣W(x,y,v) ∩Wk∣∣∣ qlk
exists. By the strong law of large numbers applied to each category, it follows that almost surely
lim
n→∞Gn(x, y, v, l) = limn→∞n
−1 ∑
i∈W(x,y,v)
Y li = G(x, y, v, l), (x, y, v, l) ∈ R3+ × N0.
Note that, although dropped from the notation, the random variables {Y li }i∈W(x,y,v) depend on
n. Therefore, we need a strong law of large numbers for independent triangular arrays here.
Since Y li ∈ L4, the standard proofs of the strong law of large numbers using the generalized
Chebyshev’s inequality and the Borel-Cantelli Lemma carry over to this case.
Finally, complete G(x, y, v, l) also for points (x, y, v) ∈ R3+ which are not continuity points
of F˜ simply by taking limits from above.
As already observed in a similar setting in [3], the independence of the exposure random variables
can be weakened.
Example 2.8. Similar as above, assume that vertices are partitioned into K classesW1, . . . ,WK
with vertices with the same marginal distributions of the capitals and exposures. The sets may
depend on the network size n but we shall assume that limn→∞ n−1 |Wk| =: λ(k), k ∈ [K],
i. e. the fraction of vertices of a given class stabilizes. For each class k ∈ [K] we are given
generating sequences {ckl }l∈N and {Ekl }l∈N of random variables in R+ resp. R+\{0}. Further,
we assume that {ckl }l∈N and {Ekl }l∈N are infinite exchangeable systems and independent of each
other for every k ∈ [K] (see for example [2] for the definition of exchangeability and infinite
exchangeable systems). For each network size n, assign now to every vertex i ∈ Wk a capital
from {ckl }l∈N and n−1 exposures from {Ekl }l∈N according to any deterministic rule such that no
capital or exposure is used more than once. Define then the threshold value as in (2.3) and for
a fixed m ∈ N and vertex i in class k ∈ [K] the indicator random variable Y mk,i := 1{τi=m}, that
determines whether vertex i has threshold value m. Observe that for n ≥ m + 1 every vertex
i ∈ [n] has more than m exposures and the distribution of Y mk,i is thus independent of n. Let
βk(1), . . . , βk(|Wk|) the indices of the vertices in Wk. By construction then
L(Y mk,βk(1), . . . , Y mk,βk(|Wk|) = L(Y mk,σk(βk(1)), . . . , Y mk,σk(βk(|Wk|))
for all σk ∈ Σ(Wk), that is, for each k ∈ [K], the random variables {Y mk,i} build an exchangeable
system. Since for fixed n the sequence {Y mk,i}i∈Wk is just the restriction to a finite subset of
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variables of an infinite exchangeable system for |Wk| → ∞ it converges in law to an infinite
exchangeable system. Let ∆k be its directing measure. This implies that the system of random
variables (Y mk,i)k∈[K],i∈Wk forms a multi-exchangeable system (see [28] for definition). Define the
empirical measure by
Λmk :=
1
|Wk|
|Wk|∑
i=1
δYm
k,βk(i)
for each k ∈ [K]. By [28, Thm. 2] convergence in distribution of {Y mk,i}i∈Wk implies conver-
gence in distribution of the empirical measure sequence (Λk)k∈[K], without any assumptions on
the dependency structure across classes. Since the above considerations apply for all m ∈ N,
convergence in distribution of the empirical measure sequence
Λk := n
−1 ∑
i∈[n]
δτi
follows for all k ∈ [K]. By the Skorohod Coupling Theorem [32, Thm. 4.30], there exists a
probability space with random elements {Λ˜k}k∈[K] distributed as {Λk}k∈[K] such that {Λ˜k}k∈[K]
converges almost surely as required.
3 Resilient Networks and Systemic Capital Requirements
In the previous section, we quantified the default propagation in financial networks after an
external shock to banks’ capitals, i. e. in a network with initially defaulted banks. It is of
interest, however, to be able to determine how systemically risky a network is prior to a shock
event. That is, for a sequence of financial systems (w−(n),w+(n), s(n), E(n), c(n)) satisfying
Assumption 2.3 with P(T > 0) = 1 we want to observe today’s network topology and exposures
and, keeping them unchanged, apply some small random shock to the capitals only ex post. A
resilient, systemically unrisky network should only experience minor damage by this whereas in
non-resilient, systemically risky networks even a small shock can cause huge harm to the whole
system. An advantage over static models such as the Eisenberg-Noe model [22] is that we can
assess stability already for an unshocked system. Further, this section will show that whether
a financial network is judged resilient or non-resilient only depends on the distributions of W−,
W+ and T . These have been shown to be relatively stable over time even if locally the network
might change noticeably.
3.1 Resilience Criteria for Unshocked Networks
In order to incorporate such small random shocks into our model, we introduce a sequence
m(n) = (m1(n), . . . ,mn(n)) of binary marks mi ∈ {0, 1} to (w−(n),w+(n), s(n), E(n), c(n)),
where mi = 0 denotes that bank i defaults ex post due to some shock event and hence loses
all its capital to start the cascade process. Otherwise, the capital distribution stays the same.
We extend Assumption 2.3 such that there exists a distribution G such that the new empirical
distribution
Gn(x, y, v, l, k) = n
−1 ∑
i∈[n]
1{w−i (n) ≤ x,w+i (n) ≤ y, si ≤ v, τi(n) ≤ l,mi(n) ≤ k}
converges almost surely at all continuity points (x, y, v) of Gl,k(x, y, v) := G(x, y, v, l, k) and
denote by (W−,W+, S, T,M) a random vector distributed according to G. We assume that
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Figure 1: Examples of functions f(z) = E[W+ψT (W−z)]− z (blue) satisfying conditions (3.1)
(a) respectively (3.2) (b). Orange: the function g(z) = E[SψT (W−z)]. Dashed: the unshocked
functions. Solid: the shocked functions.
P(T = 0) = 0, but P(M = 0) > 0 such that indeed M causes ex post defaults in an unshocked
system.
We want to consider a financial system as being non-resilient to initial shocks if even very
small shocks M can cause significant damage SMn , measured by the total systemic importance
of the defaulted banks DMn at the end of the contagion process triggered by M . Mathematically
this is expressed as follows:
Definition 3.1. A financial system is said to be non-resilient if there exists a constant ∆ > 0
such that for each ex post default M with P(M = 0) > 0 it holds that
n−1SMn ≥ ∆ w. h. p.
The following theorem states a sufficient criterion for a system to be non-resilient.
Theorem 3.2 (Non-resilience Criterion). Under Assumption 2.3 suppose that P(T = 0) = 0
and that there exists z0 > 0 such that
f(z) > 0, for all 0 < z < z0. (3.1)
Then it holds for all M with P(M = 0) > 0 that
n−1SMn ≥ E
[
SψT (W
−z0)
]
w. h. p.
In particular, if E[S1{T<∞}] > 0 then the system is non-resilient.
The proof of Theorem 3.2 follows from part 1 of Theorem 2.6 and arguments analogue to
ones used in [19, Thm. 7.3] and is thus omitted here.
We can interpret Theorem 3.2 as follows: If a financial network satisfies condition (3.1),
then no matter how small the fraction of banks which are driven to bankruptcy by an external
shock event, after the cascade process of defaults always a damage larger than the constant
E [SψT (W−z0)] is caused to the system. In the reasonable case that E[S1{T<∞}] > 0, this lower
bound for the damage is strictly positive and the system is hence non-resilient according to
Definition 3.1. In particular, by choosing si = 1 for all i ∈ [n] and hence S ≡ 1, we derive that
the final default fraction n−1|DMn | is lower bounded by the constant E [ψT (W−z0)], which is
positive (unless P(T =∞) = 1).
Condition (3.1) is an assumption on f which is illustrated in Figure 1(a). Whereas for
P(M = 0) = 0 the first non-negative root of the function is zero, any howsoever small increase in
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P(M = 0), and hence upwards shift of f(z), makes the first root jump above z0 and causes default
of a set of size larger than nE[ψT (W−z0)] and systemic importance larger than nE[SψT (W−z0)].
If on the other hand function f(z; (W−,W+, T )) is such behaved that the first positive root
zˆM of f(z; (W−,W+, TM)) tends to zero as P(M = 0) becomes smaller, one can expect that
also the final default cluster DMn and its systemic importance SMn vanish and the system can
hence be regarded as resilient to small shocks. See Figure 1(b) for an exemplary illustration.
This intuition is formalized in the following definition, theorems and proposition.
Definition 3.3. A financial system is said to be resilient if for each  > 0 there exists δ > 0
such that
n−1SMn ≤  w. h. p. for all M such that P(M = 0) < δ.
In words this means that the final damage to the system SMn can be controlled by the initial
default fraction P(M = 0). Theorem 3.4 is then the analogue of Theorem 7.4 in [19] transferred
to our exposure model.
Theorem 3.4 (Resilience Criterion). Under Assumption 2.3 suppose P(T = 0) = 0 and
that there exists z0 > 0 such that
d(z) < 0, for all 0 < z < z0. (3.2)
Then for any sequence of ex post defaults {Mi}i∈N with limi→∞ P(Mi = 0) = 0, it follows that
for any  > 0, there exists i such that
n−1SMin ≤  w. h. p. for all i ≥ i.
In particular, the system is resilient.
Theorem 3.4 states that the systemic importance of all finally defaulted banks tends to zero as
the initial default fraction tends to zero, which is exactly our definition of resilience. However,
it makes no statement about the rate of convergence. If we assume not only that d(z) < 0 for
z small enough but even lim supz→0+ d(z) < 0, then we derive the following result concerning
convergence speed. See Subsection 5.2 for the proof.
Proposition 3.5. Under Assumption 2.3 suppose P(T = 0) = 0 and
κ := lim sup
z→0+
d(z) < 0 and κS := lim sup
z→0+
E
[
W−SφT (W−z)
]
<∞.
Then for any sequence {Mi}i∈N with limi→∞ P(Mi = 0) = 0, it follows that
w. h. p. n−1SMin ≤ E[S1{Mi=0}]− κ−1κSE[W+1{Mi=0}] + o(E[W+1{Mi=0}]).
If f(z) and E[SψT (W−z)] are continuously differentiable from the right at z = 0 with derivatives
κ < 0 and κS <∞, then we derive
n−1SMin p−→ E[S1{Mi=0}]− κ−1κSE[W+1{Mi=0}] + o(E[W+1{Mi=0}]).
In particular, if {Mi}i∈N is independent of W+ and S, then
n−1SMin ≤ P(Mi = 0)
(
E[S]− κ−1κSE[W+]
)
+ o(P(Mi = 0)) = O(P(Mi = 0))
and 1−κ−1κSE[W+]/E[S] can be regarded as the maximal amplification factor of the systemic
importance of initially defaulted banks E[S1{Mi=0}] = P(Mi = 0)E[S]. If further S ≡ 1 and
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W−W+ is integrable, above result is the analogon to [4, Corollary 20]:
n−1|DMin | p−→ P(Mi = 0)
(
1 +
E[W+]E[W−1{T=1}]
1− E[W−W+1{T=1}]
)
+ o(P(Mi = 0))
Both Theorem 3.4 and Proposition 3.5 are concerned with the behavior of the weak derivative
d(z) of f(z) near z = 0. The following criterion that rather focuses on the behavior of f(z) near
z = 0 will turn out to be useful later. See Subsection 5.2 for the proof.
Theorem 3.6. Under Assumption 2.3 suppose P(T = 0) = 0, d(z) is continuous on (0, z0) for
some z0 > 0 and
inf {z > 0 : f(z) < 0} = 0. (3.3)
Then for any sequence {Mi}i∈N with limi→∞ P(Mi = 0) = 0, it follows that for any  > 0, there
exists i such that
n−1SMin ≤  w. h. p. for all i ≥ i.
In particular, the system is resilient.
Assumption (3.3) describes that f(z) becomes negative immediately after z = 0. It is in some
sense the opposite of assumption (3.1) and ensures that the roots z∗i of the shocked systems
tend to zero as the shock size P(Mi = 0) shrinks to zero.
3.2 Systemic Threshold Requirements
A natural problem that is also of highest interest to regulators is to identify capital requirements
for the individual banks which can be determined from observable quantities of the network and
that are sufficient to make the network resilient to external shocks. Observable quantities are
the in- and out-degrees (d−i )i∈[n] respectively (d
+
i )i∈[n], which function as estimators of the in-
and out-weights (w−i )i∈[n] respectively (w
+
i )i∈[n], and interbank exposures. In this section we
will first focus on identifying threshold requirements in the threshold model (see Subsection 2.2)
that guarantee resilience. In the next section, we then discuss how to translate the threshold
requirements into systemic capital requirements in the exposure model.
More precisely, in this section we seek threshold requirements for bank i of the form τi =
τ(w−i ), where τ : R+ → N is a non-decreasing function. Such a functional form has the
interpretation that the threshold (capital) requirement of a bank only depends on its risk of
defaulting due to default of debtors (exposure risk). In contrast, if bank i’s threshold (capital)
requirement τ(w−i , w
+
i ) was also depending on the out-weight w
+
i , this would also take possible
defaults caused by bank i into account. This risk management policy would not be in line with
traditional risk management techniques and would certainly be harder to communicate to the
banks.
Note, in particular, the changed nature of the threshold values τi. While, so far, the capitals
ci (which equal τi in the threshold model) were exogenous quantities in our model, we now aim
to determine them from the in-weights w−i under the constraint of building a resilient network,
hence making them endogenous quantities.
To investigate resilience of a financial system implementing threshold requirements given
by τ we want to use the resilience criteria from the previous section. In particular we have to
ensure that Assumption 2.3 is satisfied for the functional thresholds τi = τ(w
−
i ), i. e. we need
lim
n→∞n
−1 ∑
i∈[n]
1{w−i (n) ≤ x,w+i (n) ≤ y, si(n) ≤ v, τ(w−i (n)) ≤ l} = G(x, y, v, l)
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for some distribution G : R3+ × N0,∞ → [0, 1] and all points (x, y, v, l) ∈ R3+ × N0,∞ for which
Gl(x, y, v) := G(x, y, v, l) is continuous. Note that depending on the choice of τ and G for the
limiting random vector (W−,W+, S, T ) ∼ G it does not necessarily hold that P(T = τ(W−)) =
1. This is because W− could have positive mass at some point of discontinuity of τ and it would
then be important whether the in-weight distributions converge from below or from above.
Instead one easily derives that P( ◦τ(W−) ≤ T ≤ τ¯(W−)) = 1 where ◦τ(w) := lim→0+ τ((1−)w)
and τ¯(w) := lim→0+ τ(1 + )w) are the left-continuous resp. right-continuous modifications of
τ . If, however, τ only admits discontinuities at w˜ ∈ R+ such that P(W− = w˜) = 0, then in
fact P(T = τ(W−)) = 1 and we will assume this from now on. All our results on resilience and
non-resilience in the following can easily be extended for the functions
◦
τ resp. τ¯ .
Assumption 3.7. Consider sequences w−(n), w+(n) and s(n) of in-weights, out-weights and
systemic importance values such that the empirical random vector (W−n ,W+n , Sn) converges in
distribution to a random vector (W−,W+, S). Moreover, let τ : R+ → N0 be a non-decreasing
function and assume that its points of discontinuity are all null-sets of W−. In particular,
letting τi(n) = τ(w
−
i (n)), i ∈ [n], Assumption 2.3 is satisfied and it holds T = τ(W−) a. s.
Empirical studies of financial networks such as [12] or [17] show that degrees follow Pareto
distributions (at least in the tail). We denote in the following X ∼ Par(β, xmin), β > 1, xmin > 0,
if the random variable X has density
fX(x) = (β − 1)xβ−1min x−β1{x≥xmin}.
As mentioned before, to reproduce Pareto distributed degrees in our model we need to choose the
weights Pareto distributed as well. Hence let W− ∼ Par(β−, w−min) and W+ ∼ Par(β+, w+min),
where β− > 2, β+ > 2, w−min > 0 and w
+
min > 0. In particular, any choice of an increasing
function τ will satisfy Assumption 3.7. The main result of this section then identifies a criterion
for function τ that ensures resilience of the financial network. See Subsection 5.2 for the proof.
Theorem 3.8. Suppose Assumption 3.7 for a non-decreasing function τ : R+ → N\{0, 1}
such that for each bank i ∈ [n] the threshold value τi depends on in-weight w−i by τi = τ(w−i ).
Moreover, assume for the limiting weight distributions that W− ∼ Par(β−, w−min) respectively
W+ ∼ Par(β+, w+min), β−, β+ > 2, w−min, w+min > 0. Set
γc := 2 +
β− − 1
β+ − 1 − β
− and αc :=
β+ − 1
β+ − 2w
+
min
(
w−min
)1−γc .
Then the system is resilient if one of the following holds:
1. γc < 0
2. γc = 0 and lim infw→∞ τ(w) > αc + 1.
3. γc > 0 and lim infw→∞w−γcτ(w) > αc.
The theorem identifies different criteria for τ depending on the quantity γc and hence the values
of β− and β+. Since β− > 2 and β+ > 2, we note that always γc < 1. That is, also in part 3 of
the theorem it is possible to choose a sub-linear threshold function τ that ensures resilience. On
the other hand, even the constant threshold function τ(w) = 2 for all w ∈ R+ ensures resilience
by part 1 whenever γc < 0. This is in particular the case if β
− > 3 and β+ > 3, that is, if
W− and W+ both admit finite second moments. This is in line with the results from [3]. In
addition, the theorem makes statements about cases when β− < 3 and β+ > 3 or vice versa.
Such parameters were observed on real markets for example in [17]. In these cases, all γc < 0,
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γc = 0 or γc > 0 are possible and only the exact values of β
− and β+ determine the condition
for resilience.
Remark 3.9. In Theorem 3.8 we make the assumption of τ(w) ≥ 2. In other words, each bank
must at least be capable of sustaining the default of its largest debtor. This requirement has
already been implemented in an even stricter form in the Supervisory framework for measuring
and controlling large exposures by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision from 2014 which
will become applicable as from 2019 [6]. While being economically sensible, the assumption
is actually not necessary in order to derive analytical results. For the case of γc < 0 it is
enough to postulate E
[
W−W+1{τ(W−)=1}
]
< 1 in order to ensure resilience. Also in the
case of γc ≥ 0, it suffices to adjust αc for a factor (1 − E[W−W+1{τ(W−)=1}])−1, whenever
E
[
W−W+1{τ(W−)=1}
]
< 1. Both results follow from a simple modification of our proof.
Note that Theorem 3.8 is formulated with assumptions on the marginal distributions of W− and
W+ only. Hence, the result is robust with respect to the dependency structure of the weights,
i. e. the resilience criteria are sufficient for all dependency structures. As Theorem 3.10 will
show, in the case of comonotone weights, the values of γc and αc are sharp. Also in the case of
upper tail dependent weights (a reasonable assumption for real financial networks) the value of
γc is sharp. By W
− and W+ being upper tail dependent we mean that
λ := lim inf
p→0
P(FW+(W+) > 1− p | FW−(W−) > 1− p) > 0.
If even
Λ(x) := lim
p→0
P(FW+(W+) > 1− xp | FW−(W−) > 1− p)
exists for all x ≥ 0, we are able to determine explicitly sharp thresholds αc(Λ) given by
αc(Λ) := w
+
min(w
−
min)
1−γc
∫ ∞
0
Λ
(
x1−β
+
)
dx.
For comonotone dependence (Λ(x) = 1 ∧ x), αc(Λ) coincides with αc from Theorem 3.8.
Theorem 3.10. Consider the same situation as in Theorem 3.8. If γc > 0, the following holds:
1. If lim supw→∞w−γcτ(w) < λ
β+−2
β+−1αc, then the system is non-resilient.
2. If Λ(x) exists for each x ≥ 0 and lim supw→∞w−γcτ(w) < αc(Λ), then the system is
non-resilient. If lim infw→∞w−γcτ(w) > αc(Λ), then the system is resilient.
See Subsection 5.2 for the proof. In part 2 of the theorem, we characterize threshold functions
τ that are asymptotically smaller respectively larger than αc(Λ)w
γc . In the proof we calculate
the derivative of f(z) at z = 0 in order to show non-resilience (f ′(0) > 0) respectively resilience
(f ′(0) < 0). If τ(w) asymptotically behaves like αc(Λ)wγc , we obtain f ′(0) = 0 and hence both
(3.1) and (3.3) are possible (not simultaneously). In this case, the exact form of τ and not only
its asymptotics are important to decide whether the system is resilient or non-resilient.
Remark 3.11. If the weights W− and W+ are not upper tail dependent, the conditions from
Theorem 3.8 are generally too strict. If their dependency is such that E[W+(W−)1−γ ] <∞ for
some γ ∈ (0, γc] for example, then lim infw→∞w−γτ(w) > 0 is already a sufficient criterion for
resilience of the system. This can easily be derived from line (5.1) in the proof of Theorem 3.8.
Theorems 3.8 and 3.10 both describe financial systems whose weights are given by Pareto dis-
tributed random variables. While such random variables model the tails of empirical degree
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distributions very well, typically for small weights there is a non-negligible discrepancy. How-
ever, the proofs of Theorems 3.8 and 3.10 show that it is in fact only the tail that determines
(non-)resilience of a financial system. Therefore, assume in the following that there exist con-
stants K−,K+ ∈ (0,∞) and β−, β+ > 2 such that
1− FW±(w) ≤
( w
K±
)1−β±
(3.4)
for w large enough. That is, the tails of the survival functions of W− and W+ are bounded by
the powers 1− β− resp. 1− β+. Then the following version of Theorem 3.8 holds.
Theorem 3.12. Suppose Assumption 3.7 for a non-decreasing function τ : R+ → N\{0, 1}
such that for each bank i ∈ [n] the threshold value τi depends on in-weight w−i by τi = τ(w−i ).
Moreover, let the distribution functions of W− and W+ satisfy (3.4). For γc defined as before,
the system is resilient if one of following holds:
1. γc < 0
2. γc = 0 and lim infw→∞ τ(w) > β
+−1
β+−2K
+K− + 1
3. γc > 0 and lim infw→∞w−γcτ(w) > β
+−1
β+−2K
+(K−)1−γc
See Subsection 5.2 for the proof. Note that by the same means also Theorem 3.10 can be
generalized. For non-resilience the inequality in (3.4) needs to be inverted such that it describes
a lower bound on the tail of the distributions.
3.3 Systemic Capital Requirements
In this section, we translate the threshold requirements from Theorem 3.8 to capital require-
ments in the exposure model. That is, we state explicit amounts of capital each bank has to be
able to procure in stress scenarios in order for the system to be resilient. As for the threshold
requirements, it is important to note that each bank can compute its capital requirements on
its own by just knowing its local neighborhood in the network. Further, a bank’s capital re-
quirement only depends on the default risk the bank exposes itself to and not on the default
risk the bank poses to other banks. Proposition 3.13 states a straightforward robust way to
translate threshold requirements into sufficient capital requirements. In general, it might lead
to capital requirements that are too high and hence unnecessarily reduce interbank lending and
liquidity, however. Thus, we further provide Theorem 3.15 below, which accurately determines
capital requirements under a certain regularity assumption on the exposure lists.
Proposition 3.13. Suppose Assumption 3.7 for a non-decreasing function τ : R+ → N\{0, 1}
and limiting weights W− ∼ Par(β−, w−min) resp. W+ ∼ Par(β+, w+min) with β−, β+ > 2,
w−min, w
+
min > 0. Further, assume that lim infw→∞ τ(w) > αc + 1 if γc = 0 respectively
lim infw→∞w−γcτ(w) > αc if γc > 0, where the quantities γc and αc are as in Theorem 3.8.
Then the system is resilient if
ci > max
{∑
j∈J
Ej,i
∣∣∣∣∣ J ⊂ [n], |J | = τ(w−i )− 1
}
almost surely for all i ∈ [n],
i. e. capital ci of bank i ∈ [n] is larger than the sum of the τ(w−i )− 1 largest exposures of i.
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See Subsection 5.2 for the proof. Analogously, a robust translation of Theorems 3.10 and 3.12
to the exposure model is possible.
Proposition 3.13 requires each bank i to be able to cope with default of its τ(w−i ) largest
exposures. But as we have seen in the proof of Theorem 3.8, only the thresholds and hence
the capitals of large banks in the network matter for resilience. For large banks with many
exposures on the other hand one can expect an averaging effect of the exposure sizes to occur
if they are not too irregular. Hence, one can presume that in this case multiplying threshold
values from the threshold model by average exposure sizes for each bank leads to the same
resilience characteristics. We formalize this in Theorem 3.15 under Assumption 3.14 on the
exposure sequences. This assumption is motivated by the following reasoning:
For each bank i, let {Ej,i}j∈N\{i} be a sequence of i. i. d. positive random variables. Let
µi := E[Eρi(1),i] < ∞ be their mutual expectation and denote Sik :=
∑k
j=1Eρi(j),i. If there is
some t > 1 such that E
[|Eρi(1),i|t] <∞, then by the Baum-Katz-Theorem from [8] for all  > 0,
kt−1P
(
Sik ≥ (1 + )kµi
)→ 0, as k →∞, (3.5)
and for all x > 1,
ktx−1P
(
Sik ≥ µikx
)→ 0, as k →∞. (3.6)
Assumption 3.14. Motivated by the above, we assume that for each bank i ∈ [n] with exposure
list {Ej,i}j∈N\{i} of mutual mean µi, we can find t > 1 such that the convergences in (3.5) and
(3.6) hold. Moreover, we assume them to be uniform for i ∈ [n] (but not necessarily for  or x).
Assumption 3.14 ensures a certain regularity of the exposures without bounding their mean.
Theorem 3.15. Suppose Assumption 3.7 for a non-decreasing function τ : R+ → N\{0, 1} and
such that W− ∼ Par(β−, w−min) and W+ ∼ Par(β+, w+min) with β−, β+ > 2, w−min, w+min > 0. The
quantities γc and αc shall be defined as in Theorem 3.8. Further, assume ci > maxj∈[n]\{i}Ej,i
almost surely for all i ∈ [n]. Then the following holds:
1. If γc < 0, then the system is always resilient.
Now further assume that the exposure lists {Ej,i}j∈N\{i}, i ∈ N, satisfy Assumption 3.14 for
some t > 1. Then the system is resilient if one of the following holds:
2. γc = 0 and there exist some γ > 0 such that lim infw→∞w−γτ(w) > 0 and for all i ∈ [n],
ci ≥ τ(w−i )µi almost surely.
3. γc > 0, lim infw→∞w−γcτ(w) > αc and for all i ∈ [n], ci ≥ τ(w−i )µi almost surely.
See Subsection 5.2 for the proof. Theorem 3.15 provides the banks with a formula that is easy
to use and only requires the regulator to announce αc and γc. Resilient capital requirements are
then determined according to average exposure size µi and number of exposures d
−
i ∼ w−i . Since
the average exposure size µi is proportional to (d
−
i )
−1 while the factor αc(d−i )
γc is sublinear in
d−i , in particular a deconcentration of loans is favorable for the banks to reduce systemic risk
charges.
Remark 3.16. Theorem 3.15 extends Theorem 3.8 to the exposure model under Assumption
3.14 for the exposure sequences. By the same means, also Theorems 3.10 and 3.12 can be
extended.
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Figure 2: (a) Convergence of the final fraction of defaulted banks in the threshold model for
networks of finite size. (b) Determination of the theoretical final default fraction in the threshold
model for networks whose sizes grow to infinity and with p = 1% initial defaults and constant
threshold 2. Blue: f(z) = (1−p)E[W+ψ2(W−z)] +pE[W+]− z with root zˆ ≈ 1.94433. Orange:
g(z) = (1− p)E[ψ2(W−z)] + p with g(zˆ) ≈ 0.845434.
4 Simulation Study
All previous chapters have been formulated in the limit as the number of banks n tends to ∞
and the fraction of initially defaulted banks p tends to 0. It is hence reasonable to investigate
whether the results are good approximations also for real networks which are finite with only a
few thousand institutions and experience a shock of a positive fraction of banks. Since specific
transactions between banks are not disclosed to the public there is no data basis for us to
investigate real networks, however. Instead, we discuss our findings by simulating networks.
4.1 Simulations for the Threshold Model
For our simulations, we make use of the findings in [17] that the empirical in- and out-degrees
as well as the exposure sizes in the Brazilian banking network are power law distributed.
For November 2008, the authors of [17] estimated the power law exponents β− = 2.132 and
β+ = 2.8861 for the degree sequences and ξ = 2.5277 for the exposures. In our weight-based
model, these degree distributions are obtained by choosing in- and out-weights power law dis-
tributed with exponents β− and β+ as well. In addition to this, we assume them to be comono-
tone and Pareto distributed with minimal weights w−min = w
+
min = 1.
In a first simulation, we consider a threshold model with above weight parameters and
assume absence of contagious links but nothing more. That is, we set τi = 2 for all i ∈ [n].
In order to start the cascade process, we assume initial default of p = 1% uniformly chosen
banks in the network. We then simulate the default process for n ∈ {100k : k ∈ [100]} and 100
different configurations of the random network for each n. The results for the final fraction of
defaulted banks are plotted in Figure 2(a). As can be seen from Figure 2(b), the theoretical
value of the final default fraction as n tends to infinity can be determined to be approximately
84.54%. This value is drawn as a red line in Figure 2(a). Already for small n, most of the
simulations yield results that are close to this theoretical value and the networks can hence
be understood as being non-resilient. As n grows to 104 the final fractions become even more
precise. In particular, there is not a single resilient sample anymore for n ≥ 500.
Instead of the absence of contagious links, Theorem 3.8 predicts certain threshold require-
ments to make our network model resilient to small initial shocks. Keeping above network
parameters unchanged, we compute αc ≈ 2.13 and γc ≈ 0.468. A natural choice for the thresh-
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Figure 3: (a) Influence of δ on the shape of f(z) = E[W+ψT (W−z)]−z with capital requirements
τi = max{2, b(αc(1 + δ)(w−i )γc(1+δ)c}. (b) Influence of p on the shape of function f(z) =
(1− p)E[W+ψT (W−z)] + pE[W+]− z for the example of δ = 0.0839.
old of bank i ∈ [n] is then τi = max{2, bα(w−i )γc}, where α = αc(1 + δ), γ = γc(1 + δ)
and δ ∈ [−1,∞) denotes a (possibly negative) buffer. By Theorems 3.8 and 3.10, networks
are resilient to initial shocks for δ > 0 and non-resilient for δ < 0. The influence of δ on
f(z) can be seen in Figure 3(a). In particular, one notes that resilience for positive δ stems
from the negative hump of f(z) subsequent to zero. Further note, however, that resilience
is only guaranteed to shocks whose size tends to zero. Even networks, where the number of
banks tends to infinity but which are shocked by a strictly positive initial default fraction p,
will only be resilient for δ > δp for a certain δp > 0. This is because f(z) depends on p by
f(z) = (1−p)E[W+ψT (W−z)] +pE[W+]− z if a uniformly chosen fraction p of all banks in the
network defaults at the beginning. The influence of p on f(z) can be seen in Figure 3(b). In
order for a network to be resilient to an initial shock of p the hump subsequent to 0 needs to
become negative in Figure 3(b). By this, it is always possible to determine the least necessary
buffer δ to make a system resilient to a shock of initial default fraction p numerically (see Table
2 for the corresponding values of δ for p = 0.001k, k ∈ [10]). Note that a buffer of δ = 0.0839
yields α = 2.31 and γ = 0.507 and hence the thresholds required to make the system resilient
to shocks of 1% are still strongly sublinear.
Table 2: List of values for buffer δ corresponding to initial default of bpnc banks
p [%] 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
δ [%] 2.35 3.44 4.30 5.04 5.71 6.36 6.89 7.42 7.91 8.39
We want to verify above results by simulations. For this, we simulate a very large network
consisting of n = 106 banks and keeping the network topology constant we let δ vary between
−1 and 1 in steps of 10−3. For each simulated network, we then find that it becomes resilient
for δ large enough. This becomes visible by a jump of the final fraction of defaulted banks at
this particular δ as illustrated in Figure 4(a) for a sample network. The jump shows that in the
end it is only one bank whose default lets the whole system crash.
Keeping track of the values of δ at which the final fraction drops near p = 1% for 104 simu-
lated networks yields the distribution shown in Figure 4(b). It shows a peak at about δ = 0.076
and hence supports our theoretical findings from above. Deviations from the theoretical value
δ0.01 ≈ 0.0839 are small and can be explained by the finite (albeit very large) network size.
Having looked at the theoretical capital requirements for very large networks, it is now
sensible to turn our attention to networks of a few thousand banks as they arise in the real
world. Figure 5 shows the final fraction in networks of size n ≤ 104 with initial default fraction
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Figure 4: (a) A typical result for the final fraction in a network of 106 banks with initial default
fraction of p = 1% as δ varies between −1 and 1 in steps of 10−3. (b) The distribution of jump
points for 104 networks of size n = 106 with initial default fraction p = 1%.
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Figure 5: Average final fraction of defaulted banks in finite networks
p = 0.01 for δ between −0.3 and 0. For each n, we averaged over 105 simulations. The figure
shows that networks of size n ≤ 104 are already resilient for δ = 0. Even for δ = −0.2 the
network is rather resilient if n ≤ 2, 000 resp. for δ = −0.1 if n ≤ 6, 000. That is, our result is
robust in the sense that already lower threshold requirements are sufficient to make the systems
resilient to small shocks. The deviations stem from the relatively small network sizes of only
a few thousand. Here, rare extreme values of vertex weights fail to appear despite the missing
second moment condition or those large banks are not infected by the uniform initial infection.
For managing systemic risk in real networks it might, however, be of interest not only how
some uniform initial default influences the system but also how the default of the largest banks
does. In a further simulation, we hence choose the bpnc largest (by weights) banks in the
network to default at the beginning. The function f(z) then qualitatively keeps its shape as
in Figure 3 but is shifted upwards. Again, we can compute corresponding values of δ and p
numerically. We list our results in Table 3. As one expects, the values of δ are larger in this
case than the ones we obtained for uniform infection in Table 2, but only by a factor of about
2 and as before the resulting capital requirements are strongly sublinear.
Table 3: List of values for buffer δ corresponding to initial default of the bpnc largest banks
p [%] 0.1 0.2 0.3 0.4 0.5 0.6 0.7 0.8 0.9 1.0
δ [%] 4.09 6.05 7.61 8.90 10.0 11.0 11.9 12.7 13.4 14.1
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Figure 6: (a) Scatter plot of the final fraction of defaulted banks for weighted networks of
finite size without contagious links. Orange: average over all 100 configurations for each size.
(b) Scatter plot of the final fraction of defaulted banks for weighted networks of finite size. Blue:
Capitals determined by Theorem 3.15. Orange: Capitals determined by Proposition 3.13
4.2 Simulations for the Exposure Model
We can now turn to the simulation of a weighted network as in the exposure model. In addition
to the network parameters of the threshold model in the previous section, we assume that
for i 6= j, exposures Ej,i are given by Ej,i d= Ei for Pareto distributed random variables Ei
with exponent ξ = 2.5277 as in [17] and minimal value Emin,i. The exposures are assumed
independent of each other and the network topology. The minimal exposures Emin,i, can be
chosen arbitrarily since they act as a constant factor for all exposures Ej,i and capital ci.
In a first simulation, again we assume absence of contagious links but nothing more. That is,
we first simulate the network skeleton and the edge-weights independently and then determine
the banks’ capitals as their largest exposure value plus some small buffer  > 0. For our
simulation, we choose  = 10−3E[Ei] = 10−3Emin,i(ξ − 1)/(ξ − 2). As before, we assume initial
default of p = 1% uniformly chosen banks in the network and simulate the default process for
n ∈ {100k : k ∈ [100]} and 100 different configurations of the random network for each n.
The results for the final fraction of defaulted banks are plotted in Figure 6(a). We notice that
already for small network sizes there are some non-resilient network samples with final default
fraction of about 80%. As the number of banks n grows, also the probability that the networks
are non-resilient significantly increases. This can be seen from the orange curve in Figure 6(a)
which shows the average final default fraction taken over all 100 configurations. The simulation
supports our analytical result that for networks without a second moment condition on their
degree sequences, simply the absence of contagious links does not ensure resilience.
In a second simulation, we keep the network topology and the exposure sizes from the first
simulation unchanged and choose capitals according to the formula in Proposition 3.13 with
τ(w) = max{2, bαwγc} for α = αc(1 + δ), γ = γc(1 + δ) and δ = 8.39% as in Table 2. As can be
seen from Figure 6(b), already for typical network sizes of less than 104, these capital allocations
make the system resilient (note the axis scale). The maximal final fraction we observed was given
by 1.33%. As mentioned before, the capital requirements in Proposition 3.13 are too robust in
general, however. In another simulation, we hence choose capitals as determined in Theorem
3.15 again for τ(w) = max{2, bαwγc}. Figure 6(b) shows that under these requirements the
fundamental defaults still do not spread through the network. All observed final fractions were
less or equal 2.33%. However, keeping track of the total capitalization of the system further
reveals that the capital requirements from Theorem 3.15 only amount to about 61% of the ones
from Proposition 3.13 for our chosen network parameters.
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5 Proofs
5.1 Proofs for Section 2
Proof of Lemma 2.4. Continuity of f follows directly from Lebesgue’s dominated convergence
theorem, noting that W+ is integrable by Assumption 2.3. Further, f(0) = E[W+1{T=0}] > 0
and limz→∞ f(z; (W−,W+, T )) = −∞. Hence by the intermediate value theorem function f
must have a positive root zˆ. Representation (2.4) follows by an application of Fubini’s theorem:
f(z) = E
[
W+1{T=0} +
∫ z
0
W−W+P
(
Poi(W−ξ) = T − 1)1{T≥1}dξ]− z
= E
[
W+1{T=0}
]
+
∫ z
0
(
E
[
W−W+φT (W−ξ)
]− 1) dξ
Proof of Theorem 2.5. We want to make use of Theorem 2.2 for the threshold model. Thus we
describe an alternative description of default contagion compared to Subsection 2.1:
At the beginning we declare all initially defaulted vertices to be defaulted but yet unexposed.
At each step, a single defaulted, unexposed vertex i ∈ [n] is picked and exposed to its neighbors,
i. e. weighted edges to its neighbors are drawn. If bank j goes bankrupt due to the new edge
that is sent from i, it is added to the set of defaulted, unexposed vertices. Otherwise, the capital
of j is reduced by the amount ei,j . Afterwards, we remove i from the set of unexposed vertices.
We keep track of the following sets and quantities at different steps 0 ≤ t ≤ n− 1:
a. U(t) ⊂ [n]: the unexposed vertices at step t. We set U(0) := {i ∈ [n] : ci = 0}.
b. N(t) ⊂ [n]: the solvent vertices at step t. At t = 0, we set N(0) := [n]\U(0).
c. The updated capitals {c˜i(t)}i∈[n] with c˜i(0) = ci for all i ∈ [n].
At step t ∈ [n− 1] the sets and quantities are updated according to the following scheme:
1. Choose a vertex v ∈ U(t− 1) according to any rule.
2. Expose v to all of its neighbors in N(t − 1). That is, for all vertices w ∈ N(t − 1) set
c˜w(t) := max{0, c˜w(t− 1)− ev,w}. Note that c˜w(t) = c˜w(t− 1) if ev,w = 0.
3. Set N(t) := {i ∈ N(t−1) : c˜i(t) > 0} and U(t) := (U(t−1)\{v})∪{i ∈ N(t−1) : c˜i(t) = 0}.
Edges that are sent to already insolvent vertices are not exposed (but they could). Above steps
are repeated until step tˆ, the first time that U(t) = ∅. Note that tˆ is the final number of infected
vertices independent of the rule chosen in Step 1. Further, we can complete the exposition of
the entire graph by exposing also links to defaulted vertices and links sent from vertices in N(tˆ).
Now, observe that the rule chosen in 1 defines a permutation of the tˆ elements of [n] that
go bankrupt. Further, for each j ∈ [n] it defines an ordering of the set of insolvent vertices that
send an edge to j, describing the order in which the edges are exposed. This ordering can be
completed to a bijective map pij : [n− 1]→ [n] \ {j} by adding vertices that either send no edge
to j or are still solvent in the end. To be precise, let pij denote the ordering for vertex j and
let this vertex (after the exposition) have l links sent from insolvent vertices. Then the entries
pij(1), . . . , pij(l) list defaulted neighbors in [n]\{j} in the order their edges are sent to vertex j.
The entries pij(l+ 1), . . . , pij(n−1) are, in their natural order, the remaining vertices in [n]\{j}.
In order to reduce the model to the threshold model from Subsection 2.2, we now want
to give a meaning to the so far only hypothetical threshold values τi, i ∈ [n]. The idea is to
construct a new random graph that has the same distribution (also of the threshold) as the graph
constructed in Subsection 2.3 but with thresholds that have a direct meaningful interpretation:
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We work on the same probability space as before but instead of assigning weight Ei,j to a
potential edge sent from i ∈ [n]\{j} to j, now the i−th (i ∈ [n− 1]) edge that is sent to vertex
j during the sequential exposition described above shall receive weight Eρj(i),j , where as before
ρj is the natural enumeration of [n]\{j}. That is, edge-weights are not linked to the natural
indices of their nodes anymore, but instead to the order of the exposition of the edges. One notes,
however, that the random graph constructed that way has the same distribution as the random
graph constructed before. To see this, observe that by the sequential procedure described by the
orderings {pij}j∈[n] and the assignment of exposures as described above, a potential edge sent
from vertex i to vertex j is now assigned the edge-weight Eρj(pi−1j (i)),j
. By exchangeability of the
lists {Ei,j}i∈[n]\{j} for j ∈ [n], the new random variables {Eρj(pi−1j (i)),j}i∈[n]\{j} have the same
multivariate distribution as {Ei,j}i∈[n]\{j}. Obviously, also the new exposures are independent
of the edge-indicator functions {Xi,j}i,j∈[n].
Hence, both constructions result in the same distribution for the random graph. Further,
note that the assignment of edge-weights has been conducted in such a way that the threshold
values in both versions of the network coincide. As before, they are given as
τi(n) := inf{s ∈ {0} ∪ [n− 1] :
∑
l≤s
Eρi(l),i ≥ ci}, i ∈ [n].
In the new random graph, however, the thresholds τi have the interpretation of actual thresh-
olds meaning that bank i goes bankrupt at the τi-th of one of its neighbors’ default. The
sequential description of the cascade process has then the advantage that we can reduce it to
the threshold model as described in Subsection 2.2. We can replace the capitals c˜i(t), which
represent monetary thresholds, by integer values τ˜i(t) (we set τ˜i(0) := τi), which count num-
bers of neighbors, and alter Steps 2 and 3 in the description of the sequential cascade pro-
cess according to the rule that if there is an edge sent from v to w (ev,w > 0), then set
τ˜w(t) := τ˜w(t − 1) − 1. If there is no edge from v to w (ev,w = 0), set τ˜w(t) := τ˜w(t − 1).
Then the sets N(t) and U(t) are defined by N(t) := {i ∈ N(t − 1) : τ˜i(t) > 0} respectively
U(t) := (U(t− 1)\{v}) ∪ {i ∈ N(t − 1) : τ˜i(t) = 0}. Everything else stays unchanged. Note
that the resulting threshold values τ˜i(t) are only valid for an exposition in the order as specified
above. In the threshold model, however, we are free to choose exactly the same rule as we chose
in Step 1 of our model since this does not affect the final set of defaulted vertices. Hence, we
can replace our exposure model by the threshold model from Subsection 2.2, resulting in the
same final set of defaulted vertices. In Theorem 2.2, a regularity condition on the capital (here
threshold) distribution T is required. This is ensured after conditioning on the values of {τi}i∈[n]
by Assumption 2.3 that Gn(x, y, v, l) converges to G(x, y, v, l) almost surely for all (x, y, v, l).
Applying Theorem 2.2 hence yields the desired statement.
Proof of Theorem 2.6. Part 1 follows from Theorem 2.2 by the same arguments as before.
In order to prove the second part, we will apply an additional small shock to the system
such that each bank i, regardless of its attributes w−i , w
+
i and τi, has its capital ci and hence
its threshold τi set to 0 with probability p, where p is some fixed small number. The new
limiting distribution of the system is then given by (W−,W+, TMp), where Mp is a {0, 1}-
valued random variable independent of (W−,W+, T ) and with P(Mp = 0) = p. Instead of
f(z) = f(z; (W−,W+, T )) we then have to consider the function
fp(z) := f(z; (W
−,W+, TMp)) = p(E[W+]− z) + (1− p)f(z).
Assuming P (T = 0) < 1 (the case P(T = 0) = 1 is trivial), it holds fp(z) > f(z) and hence we
conclude that the first positive root zˆp of fp(z) is larger than z
∗. By definition of z∗ we further
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derive that zˆp → z∗ as p → 0. The idea is therefore to choose p in such a way that zˆp satisfies
the assumptions of Theorem 2.5 and then conclude by coupling the original system with the
additionally shocked one to derive n−1Sn ≤ n−1S(p)n , where S(p)n :=
∑
i∈D(p)n si and D
(p)
n denotes
the set of finally defaulted vertices in the additionally shocked system. Since z∗ is a root of the
continuously differentiable function f(z) it must hold d(z∗) ≤ 0. We distinguish two cases:
In the first case, we assume that κ := d(z∗) < 0. Then by continuity of d(z) on a neighbor-
hood of z∗, also
dp(z) := E
[
W−W+φTMp(W
−z)
]− 1 < κ
2
< 0
on a neighborhood of zˆp for p small enough. As indicated above, an application of Theorem 2.5
together with a coupling argument then yields
n−1Sn ≤ n−1S(p)n = E
[
SψTMp(W
−zˆp)
]
+ op(1) ≤ E
[
SψT (W
−zˆp)
]
+ E[S1{Mp=0}] + op(1)
≤ E [SψT (W−z∗)]+ + op(1)
by continuity of E [SψT (W−z)] (S is assumed integrable) and choosing p small enough.
In the second case, we have 0 = d(z∗) = lim→0 −1f(z∗ + ). For ˜ > 0, let
δ(˜) := − inf
0<≤˜
−1f(z∗ + ),
which is positive for all ˜ by definition of z∗. We can therefore find ˜ > 0 arbitrarily small such
that δ() < δ(˜) for all  < ˜. We then derive that
0 ≤ f(z∗ + ) + δ() ≤ f(z∗ + ) + δ(˜)
for all  ≤ ˜ with equality only for  = ˜. Hence at  = ˜ the derivative of the last term
must be non-positive, i. e. d(z∗ + ˜) ≤ −δ(˜) < 0. By continuity, also d(z) ≤ −δ(˜)/2 < 0 on
a neighborhood of z∗ + ˜. Hence z∗ + ˜ is a good candidate for the first positive root of the
additionally shocked system. All that is left to show is that there exists a certain value for the
shock size p such that z∗ + ˜ becomes the first positive root. To this end, let
p(˜) :=
˜δ(˜)
E[W+]− z∗ − ˜(1− δ(˜)) .
Note that for P(T = 0) < 1 the root z∗ is always less than E[W+] and hence for ˜ small enough
p(˜) becomes positive. As ˜→ 0, also p(˜) tends to zero. Now note that for all 0 <  ≤ ˜,
fp(˜)(z
∗ + ) ≥ (1− p(˜))(−δ(˜)) + p(˜) (E[W+]− (z∗ + )) ≥ (˜− )δ(˜) ≥ 0
with equality only for  = ˜. The additional shock strictly increases f(z) and hence there cannot
be any root less or equal z∗. In particular, z∗ + ˜ is the first positive root of the additionally
shocked system. By letting ˜→ 0, we conclude for arbitrarily small  > 0 that
n−1Sn ≤ E
[
SψT (W
−z∗)
]
+ + op(1).
For the case of zˆ = z∗, we simply need to combine parts 1 and 2 of the theorem.
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5.2 Proofs for Section 3
Proof of Proposition 3.5. By (2.4), we derive fi(z) := f(z; (W
−,W+, TMi)) ≤ E[W+1{Mi=0}]+
κz + o(z) and similarly E[SψTMi(W−z)] ≤ E[S1{Mi=0}] + κSz + o(z). Hence we derive
zˆi ≤ −κ−1E[W+1{Mi=0}] + o(E[W+1{Mi=0}]),
where zˆi denotes the first positive root of fi(z). Together with Theorem 2.5 this shows that
w. h. p. n−1SMin ≤ E[S1{Mi=0}]− κ−1κSE[W+1{Mi=0}] + o(E[W+1{Mi=0}]).
If f(z) and E[SψT (W−z)] are continuously differentiable from the right at z = 0 with derivatives
κ < 0 and κS <∞, then above inequalities are equalities and hence
n−1SMin p−→ E[S1{Mi=0}]− κ−1κSE[W+1{Mi=0}] + o(E[W+1{Mi=0}]).
Proof of Theorem 3.6. By assumption (3.3), we derive that z∗i → 0 as i→∞, where
z∗i := inf
{
z > 0 : f(z; (W−,W+, TMi)) < 0
}
.
For i large enough such that z∗i < z0, we can then apply part 2 of Theorem 2.6 to derive that
w. h. p. n−1SMin ≤ E
[
SψTMi(W
−z∗i )
]
+

2
≤ E [SψT (W−z∗i )]+ E [S1{Mi=0}]+ 2 .
Note that from continuity of d(z) it follows that also E [W−W+φTMi(W−z)] is continuous by
dominated convergence. Since S is integrable, the first summand tends to zero as z∗i → 0 and
also the second summand vanishes as P(Mi = 0) → 0. In particular, we can choose i large
enough such that
E
[
SψT (W
−z∗i )
]
+ E
[
S1{Mi=0}
] ≤ 
2
.
We now turn to the proofs of Theorems 3.8 – 3.12. To show resilience of the financial system
in Theorem 3.8, we want to use Theorem 3.6. In order for this to work, we need to ensure that
d(z) is continuous for z > 0. This is done in the following lemma.
Lemma 5.1. Assume that T = τ(W−) for some integer-valued function τ satisfying τ(w) =
o(w). Then d(z) is continuous on (0,∞).
Proof. We fix some z˜ < ∞ and aim to show that for some arbitrarily fixed δ < z˜ the family
{W−W+φT (W−z)}z∈[z˜−δ,z˜+δ] is bounded by some integrable random variable almost surely.
This will show continuity of d(z) by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem.
By definition of a Poisson random variable, we derive
W−W+φT (W−z) = W−W+P
(
Poi(W−z) = T − 1) = W−W+e−W−z (W−z)T−1
Γ(T )
.
Then, by applying Stirling’s approximation to the Γ-function,
W−W+φT (W−z) ≤W−W+ exp
{
−W−z
(
1− T − 1
W−z
+
T − 1
W−z
log
(
T − 1
W−z
))}
.
In the exponent, we identify the expression g ((T − 1)/(W−z)), where g(x) := 1− x+ x log(x).
The continuous function g admits the unique minimum g(x∗) = 0 at x∗ = 1. Since further
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limx→0+ g(x) = 1, it holds that g(x) ≥ G for x < 1/2 and some suitable G > 0. Now choose w˜
large enough such that (τ(w)− 1)/(w(z˜ − δ)) < 1/2 for all w > w˜. We derive,
W−W+φT (W−z) ≤W+
(
W− exp
{−W−(z˜ − δ)G}+ w˜) ≤W+M(z˜) ∈ L1,
almost surely, where M(z˜) is a positive constant depending on z˜ only.
Remark 5.2. In Theorem 3.8, we have τ(w) = O(wγ) for 0 ≤ γ < 1 and hence τ(w) = o(w).
Proof of Theorem 3.8. In order to ease notation, we will assume throughout all the proofs that
w−min = w
+
min = 1. The arguments for general w
−
min and w
+
min are completely analogue.
Since E[W−W+] is maximized for comonotone weights, i. e. W+ = F−1
W+
(FW−(W
−)) =
(W−)
β−−1
β+−1 , we get E [W−W+] ≤ E
[
(W−)1+
β−−1
β+−1
]
= (β− − 1) ∫∞1 wγc−1dw < ∞ for γc < 0.
By dominated convergence we conclude that f is continuously differentiable on [0,∞) with
f ′(z) = d(z). By T ≥ 2, in particular, f ′(0) = −1 and hence by Theorem 3.4 the system is
resilient to small shocks.
Now let γc = 0 and α := lim infw→∞ τ(w) > αc + 1. We assume that α <∞, otherwise we
could truncate τ(w) at some N 3 α > αc + 1. Since τ(w) ≥ 2 is an integer-valued function, we
observe that α ∈ N\{0, 1} and τ(w) ≥ α for all w > w˜ and some constant w˜ > 0. Since ψr(x)
is monotonically decreasing in r, we derive that, as z → 0,
E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)
] ≤ E [W+ψα(W−z) +W+ψ2(W−z)1{W−≤w˜}] ≤ E [W+ψα(W−z)]+ o(z).
Note that since ψα(x) is a strictly increasing function in x, this expression becomes maximized
for comonotone dependence of W− and W+. We derive
lim sup
z→0+
z−1E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)
] ≤ lim sup
z→0+
z−1
∑
k≥α
E
[
(W−)
β−−1
β+−1 e−W
−z (W
−z)k
k!
]
= lim sup
z→0+
αc
∑
k≥α
∫ ∞
z
x
β−−1
β+−1−β−+ke−x
k!
dx
= αc
∑
k≥α
Γ(k − 1)
k!
=
αc
α− 1 < 1.
In particular, lim supz→0+ z−1f(z) < 0. By Lemma 5.1 and Remark 5.2, we also know that d(z)
is continuous for z > 0 (we can simply cut off τ(w) at α) and hence by Theorem 3.6 we can
conclude that the system must be resilient.
Finally, assume that γc > 0 and α := lim infw→∞w−γcτ(w) > αc. We can then choose some
αc < α˜ < α and w˜ <∞ such that τ(w) ≥ dα˜wγce for all w > w˜. Hence we derive that
E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)
] ≤ E [W+ψdα˜(W−)γce(W−z)1{W−>w˜}]+ o(z).
By a Chernoff bound we get that ψr(x) ≤ (xe/r)re−x for x < r. Thus for w ≤
(
α˜−1(1 + )z
) 1
γc−1
and  > 0,
ψdα˜wγce(wz) ≤
( wze
α˜wγc
)α˜wγc
e−wz = exp
{
−z γcγc−1 g
(
wz
1
1−γc
)}
,
where g(x) := x− α˜xγc log(ex1−γc/α˜). For arbitrary λ > 0, we can hence choose w˜ large enough
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such that for all w˜ < w ≤ (α˜−1(1 + )ez) 1γc−1 it holds
ψdα˜wγce(wz) ≤
( wze
α˜wγc
)α˜wγc ≤ ( wze
α˜wγc
)1+λ
(1 + )−α˜w
γc+1+λ ≤ (α˜−1ze)1+λ
and
E
[
W+ψdα˜(W−)γce(W−z)1{w˜<W−≤(α˜−1(1+)ez)
1
γc−1 }
]
≤ (α˜−1ze)1+λ E[W+] = o(z).
For (α˜−1(1 + )ez)
1
γc−1 < w ≤ (α˜−1(1 + )z) 1γc−1 , we have g(wz 11−γc ) ≥ δ for some δ > 0. Thus
E
[
W+ψdα˜(W−)γce(W−z)1{(α˜−1(1+)ez)
1
γc−1<W−≤(α˜−1(1+)z)
1
γc−1 }
]
≤ E[W+]e−δz
γc
γc−1
= o(z).
Hence, as z → 0, only W− > (α˜−1(1 + )z) 1γc−1 contributes to z−1E[W+ψT (W−z)]. On this
set, by bounding with the comonotone dependence, we compute
E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)1
{W−>(α˜−1(1+)z)
1
γc−1 }
]
≤ E
[
W+1
{W−>(α˜−1(1+)z)
1
γc−1 }
]
(5.1)
≤ (β− − 1)
∫ ∞
(α˜−1(1+)z)
1
γc−1
w
β−−1
β+−1−β−dw = αc
(1 + )z
α˜
Hence, lim supz→0+ z−1f(z) = lim supz→0+ z−1E[W+ψT (W−z)]−1 < 0 by choosing  > 0 small
enough such that α˜−1αc(1 + ) < 1. This shows resilience by the same arguments as in part 2,
noting that we can cut τ(w) at wη for some γc < η < 1.
Proof of Theorem 3.10. Again, we simplify notation be setting w−min = w
+
min = 1.
We start by proving the second statement. Let α := lim supw→∞w−γcτ(w) and choose
α < α˜ <
∫∞
0 Λ
(
x1−β+
)
dx and w˜ < ∞ such that τ(w) ≤ bα˜wγcc for all w > w˜. Moreover,
choose  > 0 and δ > 0 such that α˜ < (1 − )(1 − δ) ∫∞0 Λ(x1−β+)dx and let z > 0 small
enough such that w˜ ≤ (α˜−1(1− )z) 1γc−1 as well as z < (2δ) 1γc−1(α˜/(1− )) 1γc . For such z and
w > (α˜−1(1− )z) 1γc−1 it holds that
P (Poi(wz) ≥ bα˜wγcc) ≥ 1− P (|Poi(wz)− wz| ≥ wz) ≥ 1− 1
2wz
≥ 1− 1− 
2α˜wγc
≥ 1− δ,
by Chebyshev’s inequality. Therefore,
E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)
] ≥ (1− δ)E [W+1
{W−>(α˜−1(1−)z)
1
γc−1 }
]
= (1− δ)
∫ ∞
0
P
(
W+ > x,W− >
(
α˜−1(1− )z) 1γc−1)dx
= (1− δ) (α˜−1(1− )z) 1γc−1 β−−1β+−1
×
∫ ∞
0
P
(
FW+(W
+) > 1− x1−β+p(z), FW−(W−) > 1− p(z)
)
dx
= α˜−1(1− )(1− δ)z
∫ ∞
0
P
(
FW+(W
+) > 1− x1−β+p(z)
∣∣∣FW−(W−) > 1− p(z)) dx, (5.2)
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where we substituted p(z) := (α˜−1(1 − )z) 1−β
−
γc−1 . Note that the conditional probability is
bounded by 1 ∧ x1−β+ . Hence, by Lebesgue’s dominated convergence theorem
z−1E
[
W+ψT (w
−z)
] ≥ α˜−1(1− )(1− δ) ∫ ∞
0
Λ
(
x1−β
+
)
dx+ o(1) > 1 + o(1)
and thus E [W+ψT (W−z)] > z for z small enough which implies non-resilience by Theorem 3.2.
For resilience in part 2 we follow the same proof as for Theorem 3.8 until we arrive at
expression (5.1) which we can now evaluate with the same means as above. That is,
z−1E
[
W+1
{
W− >
(
α˜−1(1 + )z
) 1
γc−1
}]
→ α˜−1(1 + )
∫ ∞
0
Λ
(
x1−β
+
)
dx < 1, as z → 0.
For the first statement of the theorem, note that we can lower bound the integral in (5.2) by
P(FW+(W+) > 1−p(z) | FW−(W−) > 1−p(z)) and hence we derive non-resilience as above by
lim inf
z→0
z−1E[W+ψT (W−z)] ≥ α˜−1(1− )(1− δ)λ > 1.
Proof of Theorem 3.12. Let U ∼ U [0, 1] and
X± := (1− U)
1
1−β±K±.
Then X± ∼ Par(β±,K±). Further, let W˜± := F−1
W±(U) such that W˜
± d= W± but W˜− and W˜+
are comonotone. By (3.4) we then now that W˜± = F−1
W±(U) ≤ F−1X±(U) = X± for U ≥ u˜ large
enough and hence
E[W−W+] ≤ E[W˜−W˜+] ≤ w˜(E[W−] + E[W+]) + E[X−X+],
where w˜ = max{F−1
W−(u˜), F
−1
W+
(u˜)} <∞. Then for the case of γc < 0, by the same calculations
as in the proof of Theorem 3.8 we derive E[X−X+] <∞ and thus resilience of the system.
For γc = 0, as in the proof of Theorem 3.8 we have
E[W+ψT (W−z)] ≤ E[W+ψα(W−z)] + o(z),
where α = lim infw→∞ τ(w) ∈ N\{0, 1}. Hence
lim sup
z→0+
E[W+ψT (W−z)]
z
≤ lim sup
z→0+
E[W˜+ψα(W˜−z)]
z
≤ lim sup
z→0+
E[X+ψα(X−z)] + w˜ψ2(w˜z)
z
=
β+ − 1
β+ − 2K
+K−
1
α− 1
and the system is resilient for lim infw→∞ τ(w) = α > β
+−1
β+−2K
+K− + 1.
For γc > 0, we follow the proof of Theorem 3.8 and replace the right-hand side of (5.1) by
E
[
X+1
{X−>(α˜−1(1+)z)
1
γc−1 }
]
+ w˜1
{w˜>(α˜−1(1+)z)
1
γc−1 }
=
β+ − 1
β+ − 2K
+(K−)1−γc
(1 + )z
α˜
+ o(z).
Proof of Proposition 3.13. The capitals ci are chosen such that the threshold values τi are at
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least τ(w−i ). Hence coupling the weighted network to the corresponding threshold network
yields the result.
Proof of Theorem 3.15. By the assumption of ci > maxj∈[n]\{i}Ej,i almost surely for all i ∈ [n],
we get τi ≥ 2 almost surely. The proof of part 1 is thus completely analogue to the one of
Theorem 3.8.
We continue by proving part 3. By the means of the proof of Theorem 3.8 we derive that
lim supz→0+ z−1E [W+ψT (W−z)1 {T > (1 + )αc(W−)γc}] < 1 for each  > 0. It will hence
suffice to prove E [W+ψT (W−z)1 {T ≤ (1 + )αc(W−)γc}] = o(z) in order to show resilience.
To this end, choose 0 < δ < γc(t− 1). Then
E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)1
{
T ≤ (W−)δ
}]
≤ E
[
W+ψ2(W
−z)1
{
T ≤ (W−)δ
}]
= lim
M→∞
E
[(
W+ ∧M)ψ2(W−z)1{T ≤ (W−)δ}]
≤ lim inf
M→∞
lim inf
n→∞ n
−1 ∑
i∈[n]
(
w+i ∧M
)
ψ2(w
−
i z)1
{
τi ≤ (w−i )δ
}
,
where we approximated the non-continuous integrand by continuous ones and used almost sure
weak convergence by Assumption 2.3. Now taking expectations with respect to the exposure
lists, by Fatou’s lemma we derive
E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)1
{
T ≤ (W−)δ
}]
≤ lim inf
M→∞
lim inf
n→∞ n
−1 ∑
i∈[n]
(
w+i ∧M
)
ψ2(w
−
i z)P
(
τi ≤ (w−i )δ
)
≤ K1 lim inf
M→∞
lim inf
n→∞ n
−1 ∑
i∈[n]
(
w+i ∧M
)
ψ2(w
−
i z)(w
−
i )
δ−tγc
= K1 lim inf
M→∞
E
[(
W+ ∧M)ψ2(W−z)(W−)δ−tγc]
= K1E
[
W+ψ2(W
−z)(W−)δ−tγc
]
,
where we used Assumption 3.14 to bound
P
(
τi ≤ (w−i )δ
)
= P
( ∑
1≤j≤(w−i )δ
Eρi(j),i ≥ ci
)
≤ P
( ∑
1≤j≤(w−i )δ
Eρi(j),i ≥ τ(w−i )µi
)
≤ P
( ∑
1≤j≤(w−i )δ
Eρi(j),i ≥ αc(w−i )γcµi
)
≤ K1(w−i )δ−tγc ,
for w−i large enough and some uniform constant K1 > ∞. Note that for W− ≤ w˜, we have
E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)1{W−≤w˜}
]
= o(z) as in the proof of Theorem 3.8. Hence it holds
z−1E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)1
{
T ≤ (W−)δ
}]
≤ K1E
[
W+
ψ2(W
−z)
W−z
(W−)1+δ−tγc
]
+ o(1).
Since ψ2(x) = o(x), by dominated convergence it is enough to prove E
[
W+(W−)1+δ−tγc
]
<∞
in order for E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)1
{
T ≤ (W−)δ}] = o(z). We can easily choose t > 1 and δ > 0
in such a way that 1 + δ − tγc > 0 and can therefore estimate E[W+(W−)1+δ−tγc ] by the
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comonotone expectation E
[
(W−)
β−−1
β+−1+1+δ−tγc
]
which is finite since by our choice of δ,
β− − 1
β+ − 1 + 1 + δ − tγc − β
− = γc(1− t) + δ − 1 < −1.
Now let 2 ≤ N < γc/δ and consider E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)1
{
(W−)(N−1)δ < T ≤ (W−)Nδ}]. As in
the proof of Theorem 3.8 it is enough to consider E
[
W+1
{W−>z
1
(N−1)δ−1 ,T≤(W−)Nδ}
]
. Similar
as above, we derive P
(
τi ≤ (w−i )Nδ
) ≤ KN (w−i )Nδ−tγc for some uniform KN <∞ and
E
[
W+1
{
W− > z
1
(N−1)δ−1 , T ≤ (W−)Nδ
}]
≤ KNE
[
W+1
{
W− > z
1
(N−1)δ−1
}
(W−)Nδ−tγc
]
≤ KNE
[
(W−)
β−−1
β+−11
{
W− > z
1
(N−1)δ−1
}]
z
Nδ−tγc
(N−1)δ−1
= KN
β− − 1
1− γc z
γc−1+Nδ−tγc
(N−1)δ−1 = o(z)
since by the choice of δ and N , it holds γc − 1 +Nδ − tγc < (N − 1)δ − 1 < 0.
Finally, we have to consider the part E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)1{(W−)γc−δ<T≤(1+)αc(W−)γc}
]
. If we
choose  > 0 small enough such that (1 + 2)αc < lim infw→∞ τ(w)/wγc and denote τ˜(w) :=
(1 + )αcw
γc , then we observe that by Assumption 3.14 for w−i large enough
P
(
τi ≤ τ˜(w−i )
) ≤ P
τ˜(w−i )∑
j=1
Eρi(j),i ≥
1 + 2
1 + 
τ˜(w−i )µi
 ≤ K ((1 + )αc(w−i )γc)−(t−1)
for some K <∞. Since γc − 1− (t− 1)γc < γc + δ − 1 < 0, we then get
E
[
W+1
{W−>z
1
γc+δ−1 ,T≤(1+)αc(W−)γc}
]
≤ KE
[
W+1
{W−>z
1
γc+δ−1 }
(
(1 + )αc(W
−)γc
)−(t−1)]
≤ K ((1 + )αc)−(t−1) β
− − 1
1− γc z
γc−1−(t−1)γc
γc+δ−1 = o(z).
Altogether, we derive (note that we decomposed the expectation in finitely many summands)
E
[
W+ψT (W
−z)1
{
T ≤ (1 + )αc(W−)γc
}]
= o(z)
and hence lim supz→0+ z−1f(z) = lim supz→0+ z−1E [W+ψT (W−z)] − 1 < 0, which shows re-
silience by Theorem 3.6. Note that we can cut off T at (W−)η for some γc < η < 1 to ensure
continuity of d(z) by Lemma 5.1 and Remark 5.2.
Part 2 follows by the same calculations replacing γc by γ and using γ > γc.
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